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Introduction 
Political parties are the backbone of any 
functioning representative democracy. They are 
the agents that compete in the political arena for 
public office by offering programmatic 
alternatives to voters. It is not surprising 
therefore that an analysis of countries that have 
failed to democratise shows political parties 
suffering from a severe pathology that renders 
them weak institutions. In both the eastern and 
the southern neighbourhood of the EU, a type 
of party has emerged, the ‘party of power’ 
characterised by its dependence on the state, 
the absence of ideology and the linkage with 
specific sectoral groups. Examples of such 
parties can be found in Ukraine during the 
reign of President Kuchma and in present-day 
Egypt.  
The ideological weakness of parties of power 
and their dependence on the state is both a 
symptom and a cause of the failure of 
democratic consolidation. Because they 
prevent the emergence of a multi-party system 
based on competing ideological-programmatic 
currents, these parties and their legacies should 
be seen as an important stumbling block in the 
transition towards and consolidation of 
democracy. This paper attempts a summary 
analysis of the phenomena, suggesting that an 
alternative model of party development is 
required in order for democracy to take hold in 
the eastern and southern neighbourhood of the 
EU. 
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Both Ukraine and Egypt are going through critical 
political transformations. Whilst in post-Orange 
revolution Ukraine, the pro-Yushchenko coalition is now 
attempting to reproduce its victory over Kuchma’s 
oligarchs in the 2006 parliamentary election, there are 
signs in Egypt that rising domestic and international 
pressures for change are finally being met by government 
efforts to reform the political system. To be sure, serious 
differences exist between these two countries in the depth 
and pace of political change. In the aftermath of the 
Orange revolution, Ukraine is taking its first tentative 
steps towards democratic consolidation with crucial 
constitutional issues being discussed. During the Orange 
revolution, profound changes were introduced to the 
institutional environment, affecting the electoral system 
and the balance between presidential and parliamentary 
powers. Because these changes were imposed by the 
outgoing elite, the current government questions their 
legitimacy and is presently discussing how to settle these 
crucial questions (see Yushchenko, 2005). The ruling 
elite’s constitutional choices will be of paramount 
importance for the development of political parties and, 
ultimately for the democratisation of Ukraine.  
In Egypt, by contrast, mounting pressures for change on 
the eve of crucial presidential and parliamentary election 
this year have so far failed to produce real changes to the 
political status quo. Nevertheless, it is clear that domestic 
demands for reform, which have gained momentum in 
recent months, probably pose the most serious political 
challenge to the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime since 
the early 1990s (see Shahin, 2005). It is interesting to note 
in this regard that these pressures for reform do not 
primarily emanate from the legalised political opposition 
which, being co-opted into the regime, carries little 
pressure potential to challenge the established order. 
Instead – and this is a new phenomena in Egyptian 
politics – they emanate from a rising number of grass-
roots reform movements and a more assertive and 
emboldened Muslim Brotherhood. Being united in their 
demands for immediate political reforms, these 
movements have in fact managed to challenge the 
authorities by mobilising a seemingly apolitical public 
and by organising a vast number of rallies and 
demonstrations across the entire country.  
Centre for 
European 
Policy 
Studies  
CEPS Policy Brief
No. 81/August 20052 | RESENDE & KRAETZSCHMAR 
 
Despite these differences between the two countries in the 
pace of reform, there is little doubt that the success or 
failure of democratic change in Egypt and Ukraine will 
largely hinge on the capacity of the political elites to shed 
the legacy of parties of power. In Ukraine this implies that 
the pro-Yushchenko coalition must go beyond creating a 
vote-winning coalition by laying the foundations of a 
centre-right party. In fact, if the current elite in power 
takes seriously the task of building an independent, 
centre-right party before the next election, Ukrainian 
democracy seems to have a chance. Otherwise, the 
patronage system set up by Kuchma could be reproduced 
again.  
For Egypt, this means that the authorities ought to do two 
things. First, they need to abolish all legal restrictions that 
have hitherto stifled the autonomy of political parties and 
their development into programmatic mass-based 
organisations. Second, and setting an example for other 
parties in the country, the Egyptian authorities must also 
cut the lifeline with the National Democratic Party 
(NDP), enabling the party to mutate into a truly 
autonomous and programmatic political force that can 
survive under competitive conditions.  
Surely, from the regime’s perspective, both of these 
measures are highly problematic, as they shake the very 
foundations on which the authoritarian system has been 
built. With rising domestic and international pressures for 
reform, however, it is all too clear that the logic of 
repression and patronage, so successfully employed by 
the Egyptian authorities during the 1980s and 1990s, will 
in the end have to give way to a logic of pluralism and 
competition. Consequentially, there are two ways forward 
for the NDP: it can either strive for greater autonomy 
from the state and stand a chance of survival, or, on 
failing to do so, crumble with the authoritarian regime 
that it has sustained over the past 20 years.  
The Concept of ‘Parties of Power’ 
Parties of power develop from a ruling elite’s drive to 
maintain control over the state by means other than 
programmatic competition, normally in situations of 
unconsolidated democracy or of limited pluralism. Being 
created from above, these parties are not meant to become 
autonomous political forces in their own right, but are 
utilised by the ruling elites as instruments of co-optation, 
sometimes even coercion and political hegemony. To 
begin with, they simply serve the regime to sustain a 
network of patronage relationships with the major socio-
political, economic and administrative actors of the 
country. By using the patronage networks, in fact, the 
regime seeks to ensure its very survival by granting these 
actors access to the spoils system of the state in return for 
their complacency concerning the existing order. What is 
more, such ruling parties also serve to provide regime-
supportive majorities in the major elected institutions of 
the state. Since we are dealing with transitional regimes, 
all of which have introduced regimes, some form of 
multi-party elections, the control of the ruling elite in 
parliament is no longer guaranteed. Facilitating the 
formation of crushing majorities in parliament, ruling 
parties hence serve to sustain the political hegemony of 
the ruling elite in parliament and government.  
Despite their instrumental value within the political 
system, and possibly even because of that, there is little 
interest on the part of the ruling elites to develop these 
parties of power into fully institutionalised organisations 
with a clear ideological profile. The dependency of the 
party on the state would be broken by the formation of a 
ruling party with a will and a power base of its own. The 
oxygen of these parties of power is hence their 
relationship with the state. In fact, being an exceptionally 
weak institution, such parties will most likely disintegrate 
once deprived of their connection with the state. 
And herein lies the paradox. A truly competitive multi-
party system cannot emerge within a system of parties of 
power, which unbalances the electoral game in favour of 
single party or a set of political parties that thrive on the 
spoils of the state. For democracy to take hold, these 
parties must be de-linked from the state and put on equal 
par with the other political forces in the country. In 
concrete terms, this means that political leaders have to 
yield to a different logic of party-building that undercuts 
dependency on the state and creates links with civil 
society through programmatic choices (see Randall & 
Svasand, 2002). At the same time they ought to facilitate 
the development of parties based on distinct ideological 
profiles to undercut existing patronage patterns and to 
facilitate electoral competition around clear programmatic 
alternatives. Only once these preconditions are met will 
parties make the transition to a different model and 
contribute to a further democratisation of the political 
system.  
Yushchenko’s Ukraine 
The failure to consolidate democracy in Ukraine during 
Kuchma’s period in office owed much to the system of 
parties of power, characterised by a strong alliance of the 
political elites with common economic interests, who 
increasingly took control of political power in Ukraine 
during the 1990s (see Kubicek, 2001). With few 
exceptions, political parties in Ukraine represented 
networks of economic client-patron relations rather than 
expressing wider social and economic options for ruling 
the country.  
After the election of Kuchma to the presidency in 1994, 
the strengthening of the grip of several economic groups 
over the legislative, executive and judicial branches 
accelerated. Kuchma’s ruling Party of the Regions was 
little else than an assembly of clans and oligarchs who 
used state structures to further their vested interests. In 
parallel, the 1996 Constitutional Amendments pursued by 
Kuchma strengthened the presidency by transferring 
political powers to the office from the parliament. The 
formal concentration of powers by Kuchma was also 
accompanied by the strengthening of the control of the 
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as well as the local state authorities (see Sushko & 
Lisnychuk, 2005). The hopes of further democratisation 
raised by Kuchma’s rise to power in the 1994 presidential 
election were dashed when the regime tightened its 
oligarchic control over the state and increased its 
authoritarian practices.  
The December 2004 mobilisation of masses to protest 
against electoral fraud in Independence Square was 
essentially a rebellion of civil society against the 
oligarchs’ control and the elite’s authoritarianism. The 
promise of a break with the past regime symbolised by the 
Orange revolution will only be attained, however, when 
deep institutional reform takes place. Political parties are 
arguably central elements of such a transformation, and 
the new political elites should seriously attempt to break 
the legacy of parties of power. A first step is the 
strengthening of political parties by cutting their 
dependency on an illicit relationship with the state and 
strengthening their relationship with the voters through 
programmatic appeal. The strengthening of political 
parties is a building block for the strengthening of 
parliament and, ultimately, a more democratic form of 
control of political power.  
Arguably, the Orange revolution might have provided the 
institutional incentives for such a move. Indeed, a side-
effect of the revolution, even if opposed by Yushchenko, 
was a constitutional settlement limiting the extremely 
wide powers gained by the President in the 1996 
constitutional reform. Although the legitimacy of the 
constitutional settlement is being now questioned for it 
was achieved under the threat of the use of force against 
the masses in Independence Square, the settlement still 
created a benchmark in transferring some of the powers 
back to the parliament. Although Yushchenko might try 
to limit the loss of presidential powers to the parliament 
implied in the package of constitutional reform, the 
reinforcement of the parliament’s powers appears 
inevitable. Although uncertain as to its scope and timing, 
the strengthening of the parliament will be an incentive to 
the creation of parties based on programmatic lines.  
But even if a more powerful parliament increases the 
value of political parties, a more powerful parliament will 
not lead automatically to the emergence of independent, 
programmatic parties and a structured party system. For 
this to happen, it is crucial that political leaders commit to 
take ideological coherence as their primary criteria for 
party-building, even when this implies a short-term loss 
of votes and office control. For the time being, 
Yushchenko’s priorities seem focused on creating a 
winning coalition for the 2006 parliamentary elections, 
with the institutionalisation of a party relegated to second 
place. When in early 2005, Yushchenko announced the 
formation of a new party, many expected it to be based on 
the parliamentary bloc created in 2001 to support his 
candidacy, the ‘Our Ukraine’. However, it soon became 
clear that the new party would be based on the public 
movement ‘For Ukraine! For Yushchenko!’ and would 
mainly include members of the new government, while on 
the whole the parties participating in the ‘Our Ukraine’ 
parliamentary bloc remained outside. When the founding 
congress of the ‘Our Ukraine’ People’s Union (NSNU) 
took place in early April 2005, observers raised concerns 
in the political community that a new party of power was 
being created (see Maksymiuk, 2005).  
For the moment the new ‘Our Ukraine’ shows a number 
of features that augur poorly for its institutionalisation as 
a programmatic party. First, being based on a social 
movement rather than a structured party or coalition of 
parties makes the process of creating a coherent internal 
structure much harder to achieve and therefore decreases 
its chances of long-term survival (see Randall & Svasand, 
2002 and Sushko & Lisnychuk, 2005). Second, the only 
ideological inheritance that the new party received from 
the popular movement supporting Yushchenko is rather 
vague: a commitment to democracy, opposition to the 
outgoing authoritarian regime and a commitment to the 
European route. Such commitments do not appear to give 
any decisive direction to the government in terms of 
political and economic decisions, which means that these 
identities do not provide sufficient glue and the parties do 
not survive much beyond the first set of elections (see 
Randall & Svasand, 2002). Political ideologies should 
thus provide more convincing indications regarding 
political and economic policies, such as positions on 
nationality or the size of the public sector. 
Obviously, ideological identities are not built 
instantaneously; one short-cut to ideological definition is 
thus the assimilation of existing parties’ ideological 
profiles by integrating parties with established profiles. At 
the time of writing, it remains unclear whether the 
original ‘Our Ukraine’ (Viktor Pynzenyk’s former ‘Our 
Ukraine’ party) and the parties descending from the 
Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh) – Yuriy Kostenko’s 
Ukrainian People’s Party and Boris Tarasiuk’s People’s 
Rukh of Ukraine – will eventually be included on the 
NSNU’s party lists as the Parliamentary elections of 2006 
approach. Their exclusion would worsen the chances of 
consolidating the NSNU as a centre-right party.  
The descendents of Rukh would help build the ideological 
identity of the new party. Not only were the descendents 
of the Rukh, Kostenko’s People’s Party and Tarasiuk’s 
Rukh,  instrumental in the unification of the opposition 
parties behind Yushchenko’s presidential candidature, but 
as the movement that had earlier propelled Ukraine to 
independence, and the one that is “most rooted in an 
independent civil society” (Birch, 2000), it carries an 
important symbolic heritage. Even when attempting a 
catch-all strategy, the NSNU could define its ideological 
profile by combining the Rukh’s moderate and inclusive 
nationalism and Yushchenko’s moderate economic 
liberalism in a typical conservative profile. 
Yushchenko’s electoral coalition with Yulia 
Tymoshenko’s bloc and the Agrarian Party of Vlodymyr 
Lytvyn is advancing, with talks underway on the 
principles for parity of seats. Unfortunately, this seems to 
go hand in hand with a disregard for the basic procedures 
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ideology. By relinquishing the party leadership, 
Yushchenko increased the uncertainty over the party 
leadership. In his way Yushchenko weakened the identity 
of the party, with the latest opinion polls showing a 
decline in the support for the Our Ukraine People’s Union 
(see Yushchenko, 2005). 
Summing up, the ruling elite in Ukraine faces crucial 
decisions concerning the shape of the country’s political 
system. The choice is roughly between a semi-presidential 
system in which the parliament and parties are strong, and 
a presidential system where political parties remain 
dependent on the state. By taking a short-cut to electoral 
success rather than agreeing on building a single party 
structure based on a clear-cut ideology, the carriers of the 
Orange revolution would be reproducing the path taken 
by Kuchma following the 1994 elections. Circumventing 
the process of party institutionalisation allows a short-
term attitude to the control of political power to dominate, 
at the expense of strengthening democratic institutions. In 
the absence of institutionalised political parties, the 
single-minded logic of political leaders’ control over the 
state institutions that characterised Kuchma’s system 
parties of power could thus prevail. The democratisation 
of Ukraine is thus at stake.  
Mubarak’s Egypt  
In many respects, the Egyptian party political scene 
resembles that of Ukraine prior to the Orange revolution. 
Here again we come across a system of parties of power, 
which as elsewhere in the Mashrek region, has prevented 
the country from developing a functioning multi-party 
system based on programmatic-ideological competition. 
At the heart of this system stands the ruling National 
Democratic Party (NDP), which was carved out of the 
Arab Socialist Union (ASU) by President Sadat, when he 
abolished the single-party state in favour of limited party 
pluralism in 1977. From the onset, the NDP was not 
intended to become an autonomous political force in its 
own right, with a strong organisation and a clear 
ideological profile. Rather the ruling elite at the time, and 
President Sadat in particular, wanted to create a party that 
was subservient to the needs of the government and 
dependent upon it. Essentially the NDP was to function as 
an instrument of political hegemony and co-optation, 
ensuring the regime’s political supremacy in parliament 
and government and facilitating its linkage to the 
country’s major sectoral organisations, such as the trade 
unions and business associations (see Kassem, 1999 and 
Nafaa, 1995). In this sense then, the NDP differed little 
from its predecessor, the ASU, which, under the 
authoritarian single-party regime of the 1950s and 1960s, 
had served as a corporatist umbrella organisation, linking 
all major societal sectors to the state.  
To perpetuate the NDP’s regime dependence, Sadat, and 
even more so his successor Mubarak, made sure that the 
party remained both underfinanced and understaffed and 
that the appointments of all senior party positions remain 
the prerogative of the president. Most crucially, both 
presidents ensured that the NDP lacks a clear ideological 
profile and so also an ideologically committed 
membership base. Indeed, to this day, no serious attempt 
has been undertaken to unite the party’s vastly different 
ideological currents and fractions under a coherent 
programme and to build up a membership base that is 
defined by ideological commitment rather than by access 
to state patronage. As it stands, the NDP is populated by 
old Nasserites, market liberals, moderate Islamists, 
members of the ‘parasitic bourgeoisie’ and state 
technocrats, and its programme remains little else than a 
collection of vaguely formulated principles. In fact, 
probably the only glue holding together this diverse blend 
of currents and fractions within the NDP is the dictum of 
statism, i.e. the belief in the legitimacy and continuity of 
the established order, and with it the party’s close ties to 
the all-powerful Egyptian presidency and the state’s 
spoils and patronage system (see Kassem, 1999).  
According to most observers of Egyptian politics, the 
ideological vagueness of the ruling party is deliberately 
sustained by the regime for two reasons. First, it is 
sustained to pre-empt the development of an ideologically 
committed membership base that could turn the party into 
a new locus of power with a potential of undermining the 
supremacy of the Egyptian presidency. Second, this 
vagueness is also sustained as a means to justify any 
policy decisions taken by the government, without 
formally breaching official party doctrine. In other words, 
the party is being instrumentalised to legitimise post-
factum the policies pursued by the government (see 
Kassem, 1999). This means that, contrary to the role of 
ruling parties in established democracies, the NDP carries 
little policy-making initiative despite its status as party in 
government. Here, as elsewhere in the region, policies 
emanate from the executive, with the parliamentary party 
functioning as a rubber-stamp institution for policy 
ratification.   
Whilst plaguing its day-to-day operations, the ideological 
weakness and state dependency of the NDP are probably 
most noticeable during election times. In most 
representative democracies, this heightened period of 
electioneering usually exposes the programmatic-
ideological profiles of the parties that vie for the voters’ 
attention and confidence. This is not the case, however, 
with the NDP and its candidates which, rather than being 
selected by the party’s grass roots, have in the past been 
handpicked by the president to run for public office. In 
fact, over the past two decades of multi-party elections, 
the NDP has rarely produced an election manifesto, 
outlining the party’s policy proposals based on a coherent 
ideological profile. In the absence of such a profile, the 
party has instead relied on its linkage with the 
government in order to attract voters and secure election 
victory. Amongst other means, this has been done by 
instructing party candidates and their campaigners to 
propagate the government’s five-year plan, the past 
achievements of the NDP regime and, most importantly, 
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In recent years, however, some steps have been 
undertaken by the NDP to revive the party as a mass-
based organisation and to re-assert its position as a 
prominent player in Egyptian politics. These attempts 
follow on the heels of the 2000 parliamentary poll, which 
saw a drastic decline in the electoral fortunes of the NDP. 
Held under partial judicial supervision, these elections 
robbed the NDP of a home-grown majority in parliament, 
which it was only able to salvage by re-admitting those 
de-selected NDP members who had defied party orders 
and run as independents. Alarmed by the dire state of the 
NDP, and particularly by its decreasing credibility as the 
governing party, the calls for internal reform rapidly 
gained prominence within party ranks and even amongst 
the ruling elite.  
At the 2002 general party conference, these calls for 
change eventually culminated in the implementation of a 
set of internal reforms that were intended to reconnect the 
party with the Egyptian electorate and to enhance its 
position within the power structure of the state. Under the 
direction of Gamal Mubarak, the son of the incumbent 
president and leader of a reformist camp within the party, 
several structural changes were introduced to the party 
statutes. Propagating greater internal democracy, for 
instance, the party introduced the direct election of its top 
positions and the grass-roots participation in the selection 
of candidates for parliamentary elections (see Brownlee, 
2002). Under the captivating slogan ‘new thinking’, the 
congress also debated and adopted a new programme for 
the party, which was meant to better reflect the changing 
socio-economic realities in Egypt. Most crucially, 
however, attempts were made to reverse the NDP’s junior 
position within the party-government relationship. 
Realising that a party without a programme and command 
of government policy could not survive in the long run, 
Gamal Mubarak, who in 2002 took over the NDP’s 
powerful policy committee, stated clearly:  
The NDP is the party that formed this government 
because it is the party that won the majority of 
votes in parliamentary elections. This is why the 
government must be restricted by the party’s 
recommendations, proposals and strategies on 
socio-economic and political developments in 
Egypt (see Al-Din, 2002). 
That Gamal Mubarak’s demands did not entirely fall on 
deaf ears within the regime became apparent in 2004, 
when the President formed a new government under 
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif. As it later transpired, the 
NDP’s policy committee was directly involved in the 
formation of the new government, nominating a number 
of crucial cabinet ministers with strong linkages to the 
younger cadre of the NDP. These included amongst 
others the Ministers of Higher Education, Youth, 
Communications and Information Technology as well as 
the Minister of Industry and Foreign Trade. What is more, 
not only was the policy committee directly involved in the 
formation of the cabinet, but immediately after taking 
office, the new PM also promised to work closely 
together with the NDP in the development and 
implementation of government policy and to hold regular 
meetings between the party and government to that effect 
(see Al-Din, 2004 and 2004). 
Surely, any move by the NDP to obtain greater policy 
initiative over the government, as demanded by the young 
Mubarak and evidenced in recent developments, would 
constitute a significant step in reducing the party’s 
dependence on the state, and hence a move away from the 
current system of parties of power. The same can be said 
about the introduction of greater internal democracy, 
which could reduce the influence of the executive over 
the composition of the party leadership and its candidates, 
and thus increase the overall autonomy of the party. 
At this point in time, it remains to be seen whether the 
recent internal reforms will indeed enhance the NDP’s 
position vis-à-vis the state. In any event it seems fair to 
say that even if these developments are to stay, many 
obstacles remain for the party to become a truly 
autonomous actor with a clear ideological profile. For this 
to happen, the party must engage in far bolder internal 
reforms aimed at strengthening its own organisational 
structure and at clarifying its position within the 
ideological spectrum. Such reforms must include a proper 
system of party financing that attempts to reduce the 
NDP’s current dependence on the infrastructure of the 
state, a clear separation between government and party 
officials and the development of a membership base that 
is programmatically and not patronage-oriented. At the 
same time, of course, the ruling elite must support such 
developments and put the conditions in place for further 
internal reforms of the NDP.  
Summing up, what are the chances that such reforms are 
on the cards, and that the system of parties of power will 
eventually make way for one that is structured around 
competitive and ideologically-oriented political parties? 
At present, the dire answer must be ‘none’, given the 
regime’s unwillingness to significantly alter the political 
status quo. Indeed, despite a recent string of political 
reforms, there are few signs that the ruling elite is truly 
committed to the emergence of a more competitive party 
system, in which the NDP would have to assume the 
position of one amongst equals in the electoral game. A 
case in point is the recent amendment of the Egyptian 
Constitution, which for the first time in the country’s 
electoral history introduced multi-candidate elections for 
the presidency. Although initially hailed as a significant 
step forward towards democracy, it quickly became clear 
that the amendment was never meant to open the 
presidency to true contested elections. Having been 
drafted by an elite unwilling to concede power, the new 
presidential election law makes it virtually impossible for 
opposition parties to stage their own candidates and to 
lead an effective election campaign on an equal par with 
the ruling NDP.  
What is more, it is even debatable whether any 
transformation of the NDP from a party of power to one 
of ideology can take place within the confines of a regime 
whose very existence is based on the fusion of party and 6 | RESENDE & KRAETZSCHMAR 
 
state. In fact, unless the ruling elites are willing to resort 
again to violent coercion as a means to sustain power, 
they will require the presence of a timid regime-
supportive party that provides the Egyptian regime with 
the necessary political hegemony in the central 
institutions of the state. De-linking state and party would 
hence upset the logic of authoritarianism under conditions 
of controlled pluralism and most likely lead to the demise 
of the incumbent regime and certainly to the 
disintegration of the ruling party.  
Conclusions 
As typified by Ukraine and Egypt, most of the semi- or 
non-democratic countries of the European neighbourhood 
pretend to offer a degree of political pluralism. The 
standard is for a plurality of parties to run in national 
elections and participate in parliamentary sessions. In 
contrast to fully fledged democracies, however, these 
electoral rituals have little bearing on the composition of 
government and its policy output, which remains entirely 
dominated by the executive institutions.  
Parties of power constitute a crucial element of such 
political order. As discussed above, they function as 
instruments of co-optation and political hegemony, 
enabling the ruling elites to sustain their regime without 
major internal challenges. In so doing, parties of power 
rob the concept of ‘political party’ of its traditional 
meaning in Western democracies. Throughout this paper 
we argued that the trademarks of these types of parties 
constitute a serious stumbling block for the development 
of a multi-party system based on competing ideological 
currents. For democracy to take hold in the eastern and 
southern neighbourhood of the EU, it is crucial that the 
logic of parties of power be replaced by one structured 
around autonomous and ideologically cohesive parties.  
These conclusions have of course significant implications 
for policy-makers with an interest in promoting 
democracy in the region. If democratisation is of central 
concern to the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
ideological and organisational party-building should be an 
integral part of its current agenda. Beyond the 
democratisation of authoritarian regimes, assistance and 
encouragement should be given to the formation of 
autonomous and ideologically cohesive political parties. 
Equally, parties should be encouraged to translate such 
ideological precepts into coherent policy positions so that 
in the long run the shift of loyalties from clientelistic 
practices to programmatic principles can be achieved. 
Together these changes would surely enhance the nature 
of multi-party competition and with it the quality of 
procedural democracy in the region.  
Certainly, the regional significance of this analysis of 
parties of power varies. Where revolutions have already 
created a more pluralist environment, such as in Ukraine 
and Georgia, independent political parties will be the 
cornerstone of a system of democratic institutions. In 
Ukraine this demands that the Yushchenko elite 
institutionalises its visions in a political party. However, if 
an instrumental attitude towards the parliament and 
political parties prevails, the Orange revolution could still 
be remembered as an unfulfilled promise. Indeed the 
challenges faced by the Yushchenko regime in 2005 and 
2006 are paramount: not only to secure electoral victory 
in the 2006 elections but also to ensure that the strong 
popular movement taking them to power is not 
transformed into a simple agent of the state. On the other 
hand, in those countries under authoritarian government, 
the only way for the ruling elite to introduce more 
pluralism without completely losing control is to 
progressively cut the links between the ruling party and 
the state. In Egypt and other countries of the southern 
neighbourhood, reforming the secular ruling parties is 
crucial as a means of facing Islamic parties in a more 
pluralist scenario. Indeed, it is only once the ruling parties 
are taken off the state’s life-support that a truly 
competitive party system can emerge, in which the 
ideological contest comes to outweigh the importance of 
patronage and state spoils.  
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